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The Policy Debate Over the Bailout
Plan
Kevin Simons *

ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the policy debate over the Federal Government’s
bailout of the financial industry in 2008.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), generally
known as the “bailout plan,” allocates $700 billion of public money to keep
financial institutions solvent. The Act, passed by Congress on October 3,
2008, has given birth to many programs designed to stabilize the economy.
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) was the first of the new
programs to disburse government funds and remains the biggest and most
controversial program to date. The Treasury Department’s authority to
administer funds through TARP was extended through October 2010. 1 As
of January 6, 2010, some $374 billion in public funds have been spent
through TARP, of which $165 billion have been repaid. 2 Although many
details of the plan have changed since October 2008, the thrust remains the
same: the federal government is disbursing Treasury funds to secure
financial markets, enable lending, and keep some of the nation’s largest
banks in business. 3 Many supporters of the plan argue that some banks have
such influence on national and global economics that they cannot be allowed
to fail. 4 Conversely, critics charge that policy based on this “too big to fail”
premise is unfair, inefficient, and risky. 5 The purpose of this paper is to
analyze the debate between opponents and proponents of federal
government’s intervention in financial markets.
The crux of the debate is whether government intervention encourages
irresponsible risk-taking and invites other industries to seek federal
handouts. This is known as moral hazard. Both proponents and opponents
of intervention alike have claimed the highest possible stakes. Proponents
have argued that without government intervention in our financial markets a
chain reaction of institutional failures would have followed, bringing about a
worldwide depression. 6 Opponents counter that government bailouts help
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only to establish a precedent that reduces public welfare and damages public
trust. 7
II. ROOTS OF THE CRISIS
The current financial crisis stems from the debt market, which has
grown rapidly in the past decade to include exotic, poorly understood
investment instruments. Sub-prime mortgages, home loans that banks made
to borrowers with bad credit, support a crumbling tower of debt. Years of
low interest rates made borrowing nearly free for banks, but low rates also
brought low returns on safe investments like government treasury bills. 8
Banks therefore sought greater returns by issuing home loans at high rates to
high-risk borrowers. Mortgage lenders, newly freed from the responsibility
of collecting mortgage payments, then sold pools of loans to investors who
used the mortgage payment streams to securitize new instruments, which
were in turn sold to other investors. The result is a derivative, “a risk
transfer agreement, the value of which is derived from the value of an
underlying asset.” 9 This specific type of derivative is known generically as
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). 10
Derivatives are not subject to the same regulation as common stocks.
They are not, for example, traded on a market exchange as normal stocks
and bonds are, but are bought and sold privately “over the counter,” beyond
the glare of public and regulatory scrutiny. 11 Consequently, it is difficult to
estimate derivatives’ true value. Nevertheless, the global derivatives market
was estimated at $596 trillion as of the end of 2007. 12 By comparison, global
GDP for 2008 was $61 trillion. 13 The result is a complex and lightly
regulated market with outstanding obligations approximately ten times the
value of all goods and services produced worldwide. Because of the large
derivatives market, suspect mortgages have become the engine of a lucrative
and explosive sector of high finance. This is the genesis of the current
crisis. 14
Compounding the payoff for investment banks and hedge funds are
credit default swaps (CDSs), a risk transfer contract meant to secure debt
instruments like CDOs. 15 CDSs are essentially a type of private insurance.
The idea is fairly simple: Party A takes out insurance against the potential
default of a credit issue, like a bond, mortgage, or CDO, and in exchange for
providing that insurance, Party B receives a revenue stream in the form of
premium payments from Party A. In the event of a credit default, Party B is
liable to pay Party A some multiple of the premium. 16 The market for CDSs
grew from roughly $1 trillion in 2001 to $62 trillion in 2007. 17 Unlike
conventional insurance, however, CDSs are unregulated. 18
A more
damaging consequence is that many CDSs are “guaranteed” by parties
lacking the capital to do so; in financial parlance they are
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“undercapitalized.” 19 Indeed, the market for all financial derivatives has put
vastly more money at risk than there is underlying value to secure it.
Therefore, commentators often refer to the “notional value” of derivatives.
Investors, mainly investment banks and hedge funds, profited from this
system well into 2006, as the U.S. housing market continued to soar 20 . As
long as borrowers were able to sell their homes at a profit or refinance their
loans there was little risk of default. Eventually, however, the housing
market cooled and heavily leveraged hedge funds, often running investment
to capital ratios of 100 to 1, incurred heavy losses. 21 This problem was
exacerbated by the fact that some insurers of CDSs were charging only 1%
premiums. 22 The brokerage firm Bear Stearns (Bear) announced the
collapse of two of its hedge funds in July of 2007. 23 Bear’s fortunes
deteriorated over the coming months until the investment bank JPMorgan
Chase bought the distressed firm with a Federal Reserve Bank loan in March
2008. 24 Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie
Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), two quasi-governmental
mortgage-lending agencies, also suffered heavy losses in the sub-prime
market. 25 Faced with the prospect of seeing the two agencies default on
their obligations, and thus calling the credit-worthiness of the federal
government into question, the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight placed Freddie and Fannie into
conservatorship on September 7, 2008. 26
Merrill Lynch also suffered heavy losses and was sold, with assistance
from the Fed, to Bank of America on September 14, 2008. 27 Lehman
Brothers was unable to secure government intervention and filed for
bankruptcy on the September 15, 2008. 28 The Lehman filing is the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history at over $600 billion in liabilities, 29 and stock
market indexes suffered heavy losses as a result of the news of Lehman’s
bankruptcy. 30 Consequently, the Fed’s failure to intervene has been widely
criticized 31 . In the immediate wake of Lehman’s filing for bankruptcy, the
Fed announced it would provide $85 billion in loans to the insurance giant
American International Group (AIG). Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG
had been deemed too big to fail, and a broader bailout plan was in the offing.
Speculation, leverage, and lax regulation had endowed sub-prime mortgages
with the power to topple a network of financial giants.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW: CURRENT SITUATION
The seismic events of the past couple of years have renewed the debate
on the moral hazards of government intervention in a market economy. The
main architect of the bailout is Henry J. Paulson, former Secretary of the
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Treasury of the United States. 32 Another key policymaker is Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose agency opened its discount
window to commercial banks for the first time when it lent Morgan Stanley
$28.8 billion in March 2008 to buy Bear Stearns. 33 In addition to making
new sources of “emergency money” available to Wall Street, Mr. Bernanke
also moved to alleviate the crisis by lowering interest rates to encourage
lending. 34
Originally, the Treasury’s stated policy was to use some of the money,
as much as $250 billion, to buy the worst mortgage-backed assets that banks
held. 35 However, the Treasury reversed course and decided instead to
purchase preferred stock from ailing banks as a way to provide capital,
encourage lending, and ease the credit crunch. This also gave the
government a firmer idea of its potential return on investment. The
government acted quickly, purchasing some $115 billion worth of preferred
stock from eight of the largest banks within three weeks of EESA’s
passing. 36 That figure has risen to $205 billion in the past year, exclusive of
AIG, which the U.S. government now effectively owns. 37 These “equity
injections” come at a cost of graduated interest rates to the banks, and more
than half of the $205 billion has been repaid. 38 With the extension of
TARP’s authority until October 2010, the Treasury will likely spend
additional funds as needed throughout 2010, although it is unlikely that
Treasury will spend the full $700 billion. 39 Additional plans for loan
workouts and buying preferred stock on matching terms with private
investment have since begun, although on a smaller scale and with less
fanfare. 40
IV. PROS OF THE PLAN
Proponents claim government intervention was necessary because of the
extreme circumstances. Some arguments in favor of the bailout plan are that
the entire economy is at stake, and that government action will fix
institutional flaws.
A. Pragmatism: The Entire Economy Is At Stake
Secretary Paulson’s first and most important point when he testified
before the Senate Banking Committee on September 23, 2008 was that the
bailout was needed because the entire economy is at stake. He told the
Committee that, “We must [enact this plan] in order to avoid a continuing
series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets that threaten
American families’ financial well-being, the viability of businesses both
small and large, and the very health of our economy.” 41 The Secretary was
careful to frame the economic stability argument in terms of Main Street’s
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benefit. 42 With credit markets frozen, business grinds to a halt. General
Electric (GE), an icon of American capitalism, struggled to make payroll at
the height of the September 2008 panic. 43 Had another bank gone bankrupt,
GE might well have gone under with it; the wider impact that GE’s failure
could have had on other businesses great and small is incalculable. Without
credit, manufacturers can no longer borrow to finance production, retailers
cannot borrow to purchase goods for sale, consumers lose purchasing power,
employers default on payroll, and student loans dry up. This argument tries
to divert the attention from Wall Street greed to the potentially severe impact
that a financial markets crisis could inflict on those who would otherwise
expect to be unaffected by the world of high finance.
Charles Wyplosz, Professor of International Economics at the Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, drives this
argument home by writing: “all financial institutions will have no choice but
to formally acknowledge their losses. Either they recapitalise quickly,
which dilutes existing shares, or they will file for bankruptcy, which is even
worse for the shareholders.” 44 Again the proponents make the claim that
this bailout is not just for the benefit of the banks and corporations who
brought this problem to bear on the rest of the world, but is in fact the best
option for shareholders. Wyplosz, like Paulson, attempts to connect the
poorly understood world of CDOs and CDSs to the average consumer.
Without the bailout, retirement savings could be wiped out. 45 The Dow
Jones one-day plunge on September 29, 2008, for example, resulted in $1.2
trillion in losses. 46 The interests of the broader economy are at stake, not
just the bonuses of Wall Street’s executives. It is a populist argument that
was embraced by U.S. Senator John McCain and then-U.S. Senator Barack
Obama, both of whom voted for the plan. 47
B. Government Action Will Fix Institutional Flaws
Secretary Paulson addressed the notion that government action will help
to fix institutional flaws directly in his November 12, 2008 statement on the
crisis and the evolving plan. 48 He stated that “it is already clear that we
must address a number of significant issues, such as improving risk
management practices, compensation practices, oversight of mortgage
origination and the securitization process, credit rating agencies, OTC
derivative market infrastructure and regulatory policies, practices and
regimes in our respective countries.” 49 Indeed, in Europe regulatory reform
is seen as an essential component of righting their markets. 50 Executive
compensation tied to profit encourages excessive risk-taking; lax regulations
that allow 100 to 1 leveraging invite disaster. Hedge funds are not subject to
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the same capital reserve requirements that apply to banks, thus their
exposure, or potential to gain or lose money, is greatly magnified. 51 This
leveraging power is exacerbated when credit rating agencies like Moody’s
and Standard and Poors assign “safe” ratings to bad debt, as many allege has
happened in recent years. 52 The current plan does not, however, impose new
mortgage lending rules on America’s banks, nor have new rules been
promulgated to enforce capital ratios on hedge funds.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PLAN
Some arguments against the current bailout plan are that it creates moral
hazard and that the plan is badly flawed.
A. Moral Hazard
Many opponents of the EESA argue against any government
intervention. 53 In their view, companies that have made risky investments
should be allowed to fail. Such critics abhor moral hazard. A responsible
government cannot, they argue, come to the aid of the irresponsible because
it provides a safety net for excessive risk-taking. Others are opposed to the
structural details of the plan. 54 The core of this argument is simple: bailing
out a misbehaving institution is just plain wrong. It sends the wrong
message to society, it encourages reckless behavior, and it invites the
Samaritan’s dilemma. Critics point to 1984, when the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) injected $4.5 billion into an ailing
Continental Illinois to save it from bankruptcy, as the start of modern federal
meddling. 55 Five years later the federal government stepped in again to save
the Savings and Loan industry and to protect U.S. banks against defaults
from foreign governments. 56 Each of these interventions cost upwards of
$90 billion in 1989 dollars. 57
Among the most vocal in opposing such governmental intervention is
Jeffrey Miron, senior lecturer in economics at Harvard. He writes:
“Government purchase of bank stock, therefore, is a transfer from taxpayers
to people who took huge risks and lost. . . . [This] will generate even greater
problems down the line. It is time for the government to do the one thing it
does well: nothing at all.” 58 Underlying this criticism is a faith in financial
markets to devise solutions to prevent further crashes. Providing excessive
risk-takers with a safety net, opponents of the bailout argue, only encourages
riskier behavior, and future abuses are sure to result. 59 As David I. Levin,
professor of economics at U.C. Berkeley commented to Bloomberg News,
“The structure is designed for the Treasury to be the first line of defense. . . .
A whole lot of people made money supposedly by putting their capital at
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risk, and those are supposed to be the first line of defense, that’s how
capitalism works.” 60
B. The Plan Is Badly Flawed
The objections that the plan is badly flawed are structural more than
philosophical. Indeed, some initially opposed the plan because of its
secrecy, and some opposed it later for a perceived lack of direction. 61 Nobel
laureate and Columbia University professor of economics Joseph Stiglitz has
opposed the plan for its failure to address underlying causes. During the
hectic aftermath to Lehman’s collapse, he commented: “There is a kind of
suggestion in the Paulson proposal that if only we provide enough money to
financial markets, this problem will disappear. . . . But that does nothing to
address the fundamental problem of bleeding foreclosures and the holes in
the balance sheets of banks.” 62 [Once again I am baffled. He is being
quoted, and he is not quoting anyone else.] These opponents of the plan
acknowledge the pragmatism of coming to the aid of our banks, but they
object to the lack of practicality with which policymakers are executing their
plan. Opponents also argue that even if the government buys an equity stake
in companies instead of just absorbing “toxic debt,” the public will suffer. 63
Banking decisions will be politically influenced and inefficient, and the
federal government’s vast holdings will distort financial markets. Still
others contend that the current plan will waste money in a trickle-down
attack on the sub-prime problem. 64 It would be better, some say, to buy the
toxic loans and work out mortgages to reduce defaults, thus securing the
banks’ health from the bottom up. While this approach has merit, even its
proponents acknowledge the enormous difficulty of administering such a
plan. 65
Underlying many such practical concerns is the question: does the
government have any way of knowing what it is actually buying? Many
economists, journalists, and politicians worry that it does not. The financial
instruments at the root of the current crisis are not well understood even by
the men and women who traded them for a living; how, then, will
government agents be able to properly value them? 66 The opponents of
Paulson’s plan argue that this is a bad deal for the taxpayer whether the
government buys “toxic debt” or even if it gets equity for its money. Are
they right?
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VI. DEBATE ANALYSIS
Proponents of the current plan worry about the leverage that our banking
institutions have on the economy at large. Charles Wyplosz writes, “The
Lehman Brothers story has shown two things—banks cannot be simply
allowed to go bankrupt and a piecemeal approach will not bring banking
systems back into minimal functioning condition. The lesson is that there
[has] to be a bailout.” 67 Again, the approach is pragmatic; the potential for
severe economic consequences is so great that something must be done. As
Ben Bernanke said recently, “You want to put the fire out first and then
worry about the fire code.” 68 According to the proponents of the bailout
plan, the country no longer has the luxury of worrying about moral hazard.
Critics of the plan, conversely, populate two camps. One camp opposes the
plan based on the philosophical grounds that government intervention causes
moral hazard and prevents free market solutions. 69 The other camp
acknowledges a need for government intervention, but objects to the
particulars of the bailout. 70
Public opinion on the bailout plan appears divided. Various polls show
either strong support or strong aversion to EESA, and the results seem
largely determined by how the question is framed.
Respondents
enthusiastically support the plan when they are asked if they favor
government intervention to ensure stable markets and a healthy economy. 71
The results are much different, however, when the question is, should “the
government . . . use taxpayers’ dollars to rescue ailing private financial firms
whose collapse could have adverse effects on the economy and
market . . . ?” 72 [The difference is “ensuring a healthy economy” versus
“rescuing private firms.” Everyone is in favor of a healthy economy, while
many oppose rescuing private firms. Unfortunately, the “private firms” in
question are inextricably linked to a “healthy economy.” On that even the
critics and proponents of the current plan would agree.
As for the pundits, it is open season on Wall Street greed. Wall Street is
an easy target, though it has gone unmentioned in much of the popular press
that the principals involved in losing such great fortunes on Wall Street are
in fact just a handful of individuals. Merrill Lynch’s losses in the sub-prime
market stemmed from the investment strategies of only three or four men
and their actions cost their firm over $10 billion and its autonomy. 73 Pundits
and the public alike have largely overlooked the fact that thousands of Wall
Street employees who stand to lose their life’s savings are responsible,
hardworking men and women who bear no responsibility for the current
crisis. Likewise there are thousands of shareholders who stand to lose
substantial investments.
Much of the debate follows traditional liberal/conservative party lines.
Free market advocates oppose any and all government intervention; for them
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the market is everything. Joseph Stiglitz, who opposes the bailout plan on
structural grounds, calls such advocates “free market fundamentalists.” 74 It
will be better for everyone in the long run, they argue, to let the market
determine where the bottom is no matter how much suffering it inflicts on
the global economy. The market knows best. Conversely, modern liberals
believe that government can be the solution, or at least part of it. 75 To
further confuse the concerned citizen, Nobel laureates and prominent
academics populate both sides of the debate.
A recent report on previous government interventions reveals a mixed
record. 76 Government action saved Continental Illinois’ depositors, but
shareholder equity was almost completely wiped out. 77 The Brady Plan
allowed U.S. banks to restructure foreign debt, but it merely increased the
burden on foreign borrowers. 78 Of the Savings and Loan bailout, the report
notes: “To the extent that federal intervention led to general confidence in
financial markets, consumers benefited. . . . [but] direct and indirect costs to
the private and public sectors was $152.9 billion ($191.4 billion in 2008
dollars).” 79 The Continental Illinois troubles in 1984 eventually led to the
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. 80 This act was designed to curb
excessive risk-taking and thus avoid a similar banking failure in the future. 81
Evidently, this has not been sufficient.
At the outset of the crisis it appeared that the Treasury would have to
distinguish between the firms that were merely illiquid, fiscally sound but
short of cash owing to the credit freeze, from those that were fundamentally
corrupt, short of cash owing to their own bad business practices and
unpayable debt. Yet Paulson and his team feared that in the time it would
take to conduct a thorough auditing of all the firms involved, the economy
could collapse. Instead they made billions of dollars available to all the
biggest players in an effort to stabilize markets and assuage the fears of
institutional investors, consumers, and the world at large.
VII. CONCLUSION
The debate involves many diverse parties. It is a cliché to say that it
affects everyone from Wall Street to Main Street, but it is true. It is also true
that those on Main Street may feel aggrieved to face potential tax increases
or loss of services in order to pay for the bailout, yet those same people may
well have faced even higher taxes and greater loss of services if government
had not acted to secure markets.
It would be wise to take some lessons from the demise of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund whose collapse in 1998
threatened the solvency of major investment banks. 82 Populated by
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superstar traders and Nobel laureates, LTCM invested heavily in highly
leveraged derivatives during a period of low interest rates. Credit was
cheap, leverage was high, and regulation was nearly non-existent.
Their total profits in 1996 were an astounding $2.1 billion. To put
this number into perspective, [LTCM] . . . .earned more that year
than McDonald’s did selling hamburgers all over the world, more
than Merrill Lynch, Disney, Xerox, American Express, Sears, Nike,
Lucent, or Gillette—among the
best-run companies and best-known
brands in American business. 83
Less than two years later, LTCM lost $4.6 billion in four months. 84
Only an eleventh hour bailout by other private financial institutions,
organized by the New York branch of the Fed, averted a chain reaction of
even heavier losses. 85 Yet banks with skin in the game learned nothing.
Just ten years later the recipe for disaster was the same, but this time the
bailout costs started at over $370 billion, not the $3.65 billion required to
stabilize LTCM’s positions. 86 The market principals, left to regulate
themselves, merely repeated their mistakes of the recent past, only on a
much grander and more damaging scale. Laissez-faire has not served the
economy well. As Roger Lowenstein notes, “The Fed’s two-headed
policy—head in the sand before a crisis, intervention after the fact—is more
misguided when viewed as one single policy. The government’s emphasis
should always be on prevention, not on active intervention.” 87
It might be better for the country in the long run to let bad businesses
fail, but no economist can predict the depth or duration that such “shortterm” suffering would entail. Indeed, many economists who advocate such
an approach are shockingly oblivious to the domino effect. Merrill Lynch
found a last minute buyer out of desperation as the financial markets quaked,
but one day later Lehman Brothers was not so lucky and the subsequent
fallout was severe. 88 Investor confidence was crippled, capital evaporated
from money market funds, and investment-banking giants Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs teetered on the brink of insolvency as trading partners
abandoned them and traders shorted their stocks during the summer of
2008. 89 A severe credit freeze holds the potential to be too damaging to too
many economies to risk a social science experiment to find out how much
pain and unemployment a do-nothing approach to policy would entail.
Bernanke, an understated man and a scholar of the Great Depression, warned
against such an approach when he told a meeting of congressmen in
September 2008, “[If] we [do not] act in a big way, you can expect another
Great Depression, and this time it is going to be far, far worse.” 90
The moral hazard argument might carry more force if financial
institutions showed any capacity to safeguard the system in the wake of
disaster. Sadly, they have not done so. The biggest banks paid an average
of over $250 million in 1998 for the privilege of keeping LTCM afloat and
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the market functioning. 91 They had every reason to impose rules that would
obviate the need to bail out anyone ever again, but they declined to act.
They gambled, they lost, they suffered—yet they did not learn. Ten years on
from the collapse of LTCM, Wall Street’s most powerful bankers repeated
the same mistakes of the firm they had bailed out with their own money.
The idea that the market is a perfect self-correcting mechanism is a fantasy.
The federal government has a long history of interceding in market
panics, going all the way back to 1792, when Alexander Hamilton
authorized the Treasury to purchase government bonds to quell our nation’s
first financial crisis. 92 In the past thirty years alone it has intervened in
Continental Illinois, the Savings and Loan crisis, and LTCM. Whether
government’s intervention in those cases inspired greater risk-taking is now
irrelevant. The current crisis is far greater than those of the past, and
government has the popular support to impose regulations that will
safeguard the public from Wall Street’s brinksmanship. Unless Wall Street
is forced to adhere to rigorous standards of responsible and transparent
investing, there will surely be a repeat of this crisis before long. History,
surely, has taught us that much.
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